Quantile assessments are commonly encountered in the elicitation of probability distributions in decision analysis, forecasting, and risk analysis. Scoring rules have been developed to provide ex ante incentives for careful and truthful assessments and ex post evaluation measures in the context of probability assessment. We show that these scoring rules designed for probability assessment provide inappropriate incentives if used for quantile assessment. We investigate the properties of a linear family of scoring rules that are intended specifically for quantile assessment (including the assessment of multiple quantiles) and can be related to a realistic decision-making problem. These rules provide proper incentives for quantile assessment and yield higher expected scores for distributions that are more informative in the sense of having less dispersion. We discuss the special case of interval forecasts and a generalization involving transformations, and we briefly mention other possible extensions.
Introduction
In decision analysis and Bayesian statistics, uncertainty is represented probabilistically. Thus, a decision maker often asks an expert to assess her probability distribution for a variable of interest, or attempts to assess his own distribution. Unless the variable can take on only a few possible values, assessing an entire distribution can be a difficult cognitive task. As a result, we might assess a few probabilities from that distribution and then either work with a simplified discretized version of the distribution (e.g., a three-point distribution, which can be expressed as a node with three branches on a decision tree) or fit a continuous distribution to the assessments.
For a continuous variable, we can select specific values of the variable and assess the cumulative probability associated with each of those values, thereby assessing probabilities directly. Alternatively, we could select specific probability values and assess the corresponding quantiles of the distribution (the values of the variable corresponding to the selected probabilities). We refer to this as quantile assessment. For example, a common practice is to assess the 0.10-0.50-0.90 or 0.05-0.50-0.95 quantiles or to use a successive subdivisions approach to assess the 0.50-0. 25-0.125-0.75-0.875 (or more) quantiles. In some decision situations, such as Bayesian point estimation (Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961) or the well-known newsvendor problem (Khouja 1999) , the optimal decision relates directly to a quantile of the distribution. More broadly, many models involve the use of quantile-based inputs and/or outputs such as those used in PERT-CPM, quantile regression, and small area estimation.
For either probability assessment or quantile assessment, each assessment provides a pair consisting of a value of the variable and a cumulative probability. However, the nature of the assessment is different in the two cases. Not surprisingly, then, empirical research shows that the characteristics of the assessments themselves can also be different (Murphy and Winkler 1977 , Seaver et al. 1978 , Hora et al. 1992 ). Budescu and Du (2007) study both modes and come down on the side of quantile assessment: "We favor elicitation of multiple quantiles that can be used to fit a complete distribution of the target quantity" (p. 1743). Some decision analysts and risk analysts have recommended using a mixture of different types of assessments to take advantage of different ways of looking at the same problem (e.g., Spetzler and Staël von Holstein 1975, von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986) . Using a combination of probability assessments and quantile assessments is a good example of this idea.
For probability assessment, an extensive literature involves the design of appropriate incentives for truthful reporting at the time of assessment and the development of methods to evaluate the assessments after the true value of the variable is known. Much of this literature focuses on scoring rules and their relationship to certain characteristics such as calibration and sharpness; a review with discussion is given in Winkler (1996) . Mathematically, these scoring rules developed for probability assessment can be used to evaluate quantile assessments as well as probability assessments. However, no one seems to have addressed whether the ex ante incentives for truthful reporting with such scoring rules carry over to the process of quantile assessment. Also, despite the fact that quantile assessment is widely used in practice, very little attention has been paid to elicitation incentives and evaluation measures designed specifically for quantile assessments. Two important exceptions are Cervera and Muñoz (1996) and Gneiting and Raftery (2007) .
The idea that an expert has "true probabilities" or "true quantiles" ready to be downloaded and reported is, of course, a convenient fiction. A compelling alternate view is that subjective judgments and preferences are constructed as the assessment process moves along and that the process should be designed in a way to facilitate that construction (e.g., Payne et al. 1993, Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006) . In that sense, we might think of scoring rules not as providing incentives for truthful reporting, but rather as providing assistance and incentives for the investment of effort toward careful construction of "good" (e.g., coherent and accurate) probabilities and/or quantiles. Thus, although we often use the standard scoring rule terminology of incentives for truthful reporting, it can be interpreted in the alternate sense related to the construction of judgments. Also, keep in mind that the methods that we study can be used to evaluate quantiles obtained from models or statistical methods as well as subjectively assessed quantiles, in which case the incentives are for careful selection or gathering of data, careful modeling, and careful analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss incentives for truthful reporting in quantile assessment and measures for evaluating such assessments. We show that scoring rules designed for probability assessment do not provide appropriate incentives when used for quantile assessment. Instead of encouraging careful reporting, they encourage extreme reporting. We then turn to scoring rules that provide proper incentives for quantile assessment and study their characteristics, building on Cervera and Muñoz (1996) and Gneiting and Raftery (2007) and presenting results that show how such rules reward sharpness (reduced dispersion). This paper is organized as follows. In §2, we review scoring rules for probability assessments and investigate some implications of their use for quantile assessments. Next, we develop a framework for strictly proper scoring rules for quantile assessment in §3 and study a convenient linear family of scoring rules. We extend the quantile assessment framework to the assessment of multiple quantiles in §4 and discuss the implementation of scoring rules for quantile assessment in §5. A special case, that of interval forecasts, is considered in §6, and a generalization of the linear family using transformations is discussed in §7. The results are summarized in §8.
Scoring Rules for Probabilities
Suppose that an expert's beliefs about a random variablex are represented by a cumulative distribution function (cdf), which we denote by F . To avoid nonunique quantiles, we assume that F is continuous and strictly increasing on what the expert believes is the support ofx. In probability assessment, the expert reports a cumulative probability p corresponding to a fixed value q ofx. In quantile assessment, the expert reports a quantile q corresponding to a fixed cumulative probability p ∈ 0 1 . Either way, the result is a pair q p , with q predetermined in probability assessment and p predetermined in quantile assessment.
A scoring rule for a probability assessment in this setting assigns a score S p e , where e depends on x, the observed value ofx: e = I x q , where I is the indicator function. From the viewpoint of the expert, her expected score is E F S p ẽ = F q S p 1 + 1 − F q S p 0 . When the scoring rule has the property that the expert can maximize her expected score if and only if she reports p = F q , then it is said to be strictly proper. This property is important because it can provide an incentive for truthful reporting. The objective of wanting to maximize the expected score is implied if there is a monetary reward linear in the score and the expert is risk neutral for monetary rewards in the appropriate range, or if the score itself is its own intrinsic reward and her utility for the score is linear.
What happens to the incentive properties of these strictly proper scoring rules designed for probability assessment if they are used for quantile assessment? As the following result shows, the incentive for truthful reporting no longer holds when a quantile is being reported for a given p. Proposition 2.1. A scoring rule that is strictly proper for probability assessment is never strictly proper in a quantile-assessment setting with p ∈ 0 1 . Proof. The expected score as viewed by the expert is a weighted average of the two possible scores, F q S p 1 + 1 − F q S p 0 . In this setting, S p 1 and S p 0 are fixed because p is fixed. Therefore, the expert should put all of the weight on the larger of the two scores. If S p 1 < S p 0 , any q such that F q = 0 (i.e., q x, where x is the lower bound, possibly − , of the support ofx) is optimal. Similarly, if S p 1 > S p 0 , any q such that F q = 1 (i.e., q x, wherex is the upper bound, possibly , of the support ofx) is optimal. Finally, if S p 1 = S p 0 , all reported values of q yield exactly the same expected score.
As we move from probability assessment to quantile assessment, the incentive to maximize the expected score implies that the optimal strategy of reporting truthfully shifts to a strategy of giving an extreme report to ensure being on one particular side of the true value. If the expert uses this strategy, the most we can learn from the report is that it cannot be larger than the lowest possible value x or smaller than the highest possible valuex. Moreover, we INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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cannot even learn that in the special case where S p 1 = S p 0 , for which the report is completely uninformative because the expected score is the same for all possible reports. The condition S p 1 = S p 0 can occur only at a single value of p because S p 1 is strictly increasing and S p 0 strictly decreasing in p for any scoring rule that is strictly proper for probability assessment. For the symmetric scoring rules commonly encountered in practice, S p 1 = S p 0 when p = 0 5 (i.e., the baseline probability is 0.5), but for asymmetric rules (Winkler 1994 , Jose et al. 2008 ) the baseline probability can be some p = 0 5. The fact that the incentive for truthful reporting exhibited by scoring rules for probability assessment (assessing p for a fixed q) does not carry over to the situation where the (q p) pair is assessed through quantile assessment (assessing q for a fixed p) should not be surprising. In the former case, we are working with differences p − e in terms of probabilities, whereas in the latter case we are working with deviations q −x in terms of values ofx. By way of analogy, think about regression analysis, where a linear regression of y on x yields a different function than a linear regression of x on y unlessx andỹ are perfectly correlated.
In addition to the issue of incentives for truthful reporting, scoring rules are frequently used for ex post evaluation of probabilities. What are the implications of typical ex post evaluations when the setting is quantile assessment instead of probability assessment? The score, or the average score over a number of occasions, is one measure of accuracy of the information that is provided [the (q p) pairs]. Perhaps that measure can still provide some useful information when q has been assessed for a fixed p, but some characteristics often investigated ex post through the (q p) pairs and the corresponding observed values ofx are more problematic.
Two such characteristics are sharpness and calibration. Sharpness relates to the extent to which the probability p is close to zero or one, therefore suggesting less uncertainty about the outcome. Calibration refers to the degree to which the relative frequency r of occurrence of an event agrees with the probability when we consider all situations for which the expert has given a particular probability value p. The incentive to report a probability truthfully under a strictly proper scoring rule translates to an ex post average score that is highest when p = r, which means perfect calibration. For example, a decomposition of the average score from a quadratic scoring rule with S p e = 1 − e − p 2 includes the term − r − p 2 as a measure of calibration. With this measure, zero represents perfect calibration and any deviation of r from p lowers the average score due to miscalibration. For experts who are perfectly calibrated, the average score over the occasions for which a probability of p was reported isS r p r = p = 1 − p 1 − p , which is highest when p = 0 or 1. The term −p 1 − p is a measure of sharpness; it is maximized at p = 0 or 1 and minimized at p = 0 5. Thus, among perfectly calibrated assessors, those with sharper probabilities receive higher average scores. Quadratic scoring rules are commonly used in practice-e.g., the Brier score (Brier 1950) in weather forecasting-and − r − p 2 and −p 1 − p are reasonable measures of calibration and sharpness. Different measures can be found from other scoring rules.
What if these characteristics are used in quantile assessment? First, the expert has no control over p, which is fixed in quantile assessment, so measures of sharpness such as −p 1 − p are not helpful in evaluating quantile assessments. Next, from Proposition 2.1, the incentive is to report extreme probabilities when scoring rules that are strictly proper for probability assessment are used to evaluate quantile assessments. Competition among experts can also lead to the reporting of extreme probabilities (Lichtendahl and Winkler 2007) . Thus, we would not necessarily expect to see good calibration. However, the primary focus in the empirical evaluation of probabilities in practice is usually on calibration (Lichtenstein et al. 1982, Budescu and Du 2007) . Suppose that the expert, instead of trying to maximize an average score, focuses solely on achieving good calibration because of a perception that she will be evaluated primarily on calibration. Proposition 2.2 shows that this could lead to quantile assessments that are effectively of no value. Proof. In n repeated trials, the expert can report q x on n p of the trials, where n p is the closest integer to np, and q x on the remaining n − n p trials. Then, r − p 2 = n p − np /n 2 n −2 → 0 as n → . No information aboutx is needed to execute this strategy.
Thus, someone who knows very little aboutx can achieve a good calibration score in a sequence of quantile assessments. This result also holds for other calibration measures (whether based on strictly proper scoring rules or not) that use different metrics to measure the distance between r and p. The distance of x from q does not matter; for each assessment, we only care whether x q. An expert monitoring her results can always adjust assessments sequentially to correct for miscalibration. For example, if p = 0 3 and the expert realizes that only 10% of the observed values have been below her 0 3 quantiles, she can give extremely high values for some assessed 0 3 quantiles to increase that percentage and bring it closer to 30%. The scoring rule provides no penalty for doing so, just as it provides no penalty for the extreme reporting shown in Proposition 2.1. For probability assessment, in contrast, attempts to improve calibration in this manner result in reductions in expected score, although a probability assessor simply focusing on calibration rather than the score from a strictly INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
proper scoring rule can "game the system" in a manner that echoes Proposition 2.2 (Foster and Vohra 1998).
We have seen in this section that various problems can arise in attempting to take a scoring rule that is strictly proper for probability assessment and use it as an ex ante incentive or for ex post evaluation in a quantile-assessment setting. Therefore, we feel that it is worthwhile to consider scoring rules that are designed specifically for quantile assessment to avoid these problems. In the following sections, we investigate a framework for strictly proper scoring rules for quantile assessment.
Scoring Rules for Quantiles
A scoring rule designed specifically for a quantile assessment assigns a score S q x , so that unlike the score S p e in §2, the score depends on the actual value x ofx and not just on whether x q. From the viewpoint of the expert, her expected score is E F S q x = − S q x dF x . When the scoring rule has the property that the expert can maximize her expected score if and only if she reports q = F −1 p , then it is strictly proper, providing an incentive for truthful reporting in quantile assessment just as in the case of a strictly proper scoring rule for probability assessment. In our discussion of quantile assessment, we assume that p ∈ 0 1 . We can draw on early work in Bayesian point estimation, as Cervera and Muñoz (1996) do, to generate a strictly proper scoring rule for quantiles. Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) show that under a linear loss function in a point estimation problem, the optimal estimate is a quantile of the distribution. The linear loss function in our "point prediction" setting is of the form
wherex is the prediction ("estimate") and c o and c u are the per-unit costs of overestimation and underestimation, respectively, from an opportunity-loss perspective. The estimate that minimizes expected loss is a quantile:
Letting q =x and p = c u / c u + c o and normalizing (1) by dividing by c u +c o , which does not change the expectedloss minimizing solution, we can convert the loss function in (1) to
where z + = max z 0 . To change the orientation from minimizing to maximizing and to allow the score to be positive instead of negative if desired (viewing it as a reward, perhaps a monetary reward), we can multiply (2) by −1 and add a constant term g without affecting the optimal q. The resulting scoring rule, which we call a linear scoring rule because it is linear in x − q + and q − x + , or piecewise linear in x − q, is
The corresponding expected score from the viewpoint of the expert is
Proposition 3.1. The linear scoring rule in (3) is strictly proper for a quantile assessment with p ∈ 0 1 .
Proof. The solution to the Bayesian point estimation problem shows that the value of q that maximizes E S q x is q * = F −1 p , verifying that the scoring rule is strictly proper.
An example of a realistic problem with the type of loss function given in (1) 
This problem is often called the newsvendor problem, where the retailer is a newsvendor deciding how many newspapers to order on a given day. Details can be changed without affecting the basic structure. For example, if unsold items can be returned for a partial refund or can be kept in inventory at some carrying cost and sold the following period, then c o can be adjusted accordingly.
From the newsvendor problem, we see that the scoring rule
is an affine transformation of the linear scoring rule in (3) and is therefore strictly proper. Cervera and Muñoz (1996) give a generalized form of the rule in (5), multiplying by a constant and adding an arbitrary function of x that does not depend on q. These changes add some flexibility while maintaining the strictly proper nature of the rule. Another equivalent version of the linear rule in (5) is called the check (or tick) function and is used in the econometric literature to verify the quality of quantile regressions (e.g., Koenker and Bassett 1978, Giacomini and Komunjer 2005) . It is interesting to note that a linear scoring rule is strictly proper for quantile assessment, whereas a quadratic scoring rule (involving squared deviations between q and x) is not proper because the optimal q is not a fixed quantile. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
With the familiar symmetric squared-error loss commonly used in statistics, for example, the optimal q is the mean ofx. In a probability-assessment setting, on the other hand, a scoring rule quadratic in p − e, such as the Brier score, is strictly proper, but a scoring rule linear in p − e is not proper, leading to extreme assessed probabilities of zero or one. This relates to the point made in §2 that evaluating assessments in terms of probabilities is different than evaluating them in terms of quantiles and demonstrates the importance of finding evaluation measures that are suitable for the particular assessment process that is used. An appealing feature of the linear scoring rule for quantile assessment is that the inventory problem discussed above provides a simple, realistic decision-making situation for which the form of the payoff function is exactly the form of the linear scoring rule. The optimal strategy in the inventory problem is identical to the optimal reporting strategy in the quantile assessment problem. This is consistent with Savage's (1971) "share of the business" notion.
Multiple Quantiles
There are situations where a single quantile is sufficient for decision-making purposes. An example is the decision about how many papers to order in the newsvendor problem. Even in that situation, however, further information about F is needed if the newsvendor is considering getting additional information about the demand for papers. More generally, we are typically interested in more information aboutx and want to assess multiple quantiles. Suppose that we want to assess m quantiles q 1 q m for the random variablex. For the assessment of q i , i = 1 m, we use the linear scoring rule in (3) with coefficients p i and 1 − p i , where 0 < p 1 < · · · < p m < 1. That yields q p), where q = q 1 q m and p = p 1 p m . Adding the m scores, as Cervera and Muñoz (1996) and Gneiting and Raftery (2007) do with scores based on generalizations of (5), encourages truthful reporting q i = F −1 p i i = 1 m for an expert who wants to maximize her expected score.
Proposition 4.1. The scoring rule
is strictly proper, with the assessed quantiles ordered as follows:
Proof. The additive scoring rule implies separability of the assessments. Therefore, S q x is strictly proper because each S q i x is strictly proper, and the ordering of the quantiles follows from the ordering of p 1 p m and the assumption that F is strictly increasing.
From (6), the score approaches an upper bound of mg in the limiting case when all of the assessed quantiles approach equality with each other and with the observed value x, so that the last two terms in (6) approach zero. Next, we consider some properties of S q x . For convenience, we define q 0 = − and q m+1 = .
Proposition 4.2. S q x from (6) is piecewise linear and concave in x, with
if q j x q j+1 , j = 0 m, where
Thus, (7) follows from (6). S q x is piecewise linear in x from (7) and concave because the slopes b j are decreasing in j.
where
integer, b k = > 0 and q k is not (is) a unique maximum. Letting x = q k in (7) and rearranging terms yields (8) with
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from which expanding q k − q i and q i − q k into terms q i+1 − q i and q i − q i−1 and rearranging again gives us (9).
From Propositions 4.2 and 4.3, we see that the slopes of the piecewise-linear, concave S q x can be expressed in terms of sums of left-hand and right-hand cumulative probabilities p i and 1 − p i . Slopes of successive pieces always decrease by one, which means that arg max S q x can be determined by the initial slope b 0 , which is the sum of the m right-hand cumulative probabilities. The maximum score for a given q is equal to the upper bound of mg minus w q 0, which represents a penalty for spreading out the quantiles. The contribution to this penalty of each interval between adjoining quantiles is the product of the width of the interval and a weight that becomes smaller as we move from intervals near the highest score toward intervals in the lower or upper tail. m , then we can decompose the score S q x from (6) and the corresponding expected score as follows:
and
, Sk − S q x simplifies to (12). This gives us (10), and (11) follows directly.
If x = q k , or if q k < x q k+1 and the slopes are integers so that b k = 0, then v q x = 0. In this case, the only reduction from the maximum score mg is the penalty w q 0 for spreading out the quantiles. Otherwise, the score does not reach its maximum mg − w q for the assessed q, but is penalized further by an amount v q x > 0. This additional penalty is a function of how far x is from q k , with a different weight for each interval between quantiles from S q x as a function of x for quantiles based on N 500 100 and N 500 50 . x to q k (including the partial interval from x to the nearest quantile in the direction of q k ). The contribution to the penalty of each interval is the width of the interval multiplied by a weight that becomes larger as the intervals are further from q k and the corresponding slopes get larger. Consider an expert who is asked to assess her 0 05, 0 25, 0 50, 0 75, and 0 95 quantiles forx, using the scoring rule in (6) with g = 200. Here m = 5, the slopes b 0 b 5 of the segments of S q x are 2 5, 1 5, 0 5, −0 5, −1 5, and −2 5, and S q x is maximized at x = q 3 , the median of the expert's distribution ofx. Suppose that distribution is normal with mean 500 and standard deviation 100, i.e., x ∼ N 500 100 . The score S q x is shown in Figure 1 as a function of x assuming that the expert reports quantiles based on N 500 100 and assuming that she reports quantiles based on N 500 50 . From (9), the lower standard deviation yields a lower value of w q because the quantiles are less spread out, leading to narrower intervals between successive quantiles. That is why the maximum score at x = q 3 = 500, which equals 1 000−w q , is higher for the standard deviation of 50. However, with the lessspread-out quantiles the slopes get steeper more quickly as we move away from x = 500, and the score is higher for the standard deviation of 100 if x < 441 or x > 559.
The scoring rule in (6) is strictly proper, so not reporting quantiles truthfully leads to a decrease in the expert's expected score. What happens if the expert's distribution ofx is N 500 100 but she reports quantiles based on a normal distribution with a different mean or standard deviation? Figure 2 shows the expected score as a function of for reports based on N 100 , and Figure 3 shows the expected score as a function of for reports based on N 500
. The expected score appears to be more sensitive to changes in the mean: Basing quantiles on a mean of 450 or 550 instead of 500 results in about the same reduction in expected score as basing quantiles on a standard deviation of 50 or 175 instead of 100. This provides an indication of reductions in expected score due to not reporting truthfully. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Figure 2.
Expected score as a function of when the expert's distribution is N 500 100 and reports are based on N 100 . Expected score
If the expert does report her quantiles truthfully to maximize her expected score, as per Proposition 4.1, then how will her expected score vary with a change in the mean or standard deviation of her distribution? A change in the mean shifts all of the quantiles by the same amount, and the width of the intervals between quantiles remains unchanged, as does the expected score. As for dispersion, we would expect the expected score to be lower if her standard deviation increases. As discussed above, w q decreases as the dispersion of the expert's distribution decreases. Similarly, (12) implies that E F v q x will decrease as the dispersion of F decreases because the quantiles are less spread out and x itself is expected to be less distant from arg max S q x . For the normal example, the expected score for an expert who truthfully reports quantiles based on her N 500 distribution forx is linear as a function of with a negative slope, −1 24. Thus, as increases, the expected score is reduced.
Not all of the details of the normal example generalize to other distributions. For example, the linearity of the rela- Figure 3 .
Expected score as a function of when the expert's distribution is N 500 100 and reports are based on N 500 . tionship between E F S q x and does not hold for all distributions. However, Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 generalize the location invariance of the expected score and the connection between dispersion and the expected score. 
Proposition 4.5 verifies that the expected score is invariant with respect to location shifts for all distributions. Note that once x is observed, S q G x and S q F x will not, in general, be equal. When we take expectations, however, scores for q G and q F are integrated with respect to their underlying distributions G and F , so the expected scores are equal.
Next, we turn to the impact of a change in dispersion on the expected score. In comparing two cdfs ofx, F and G, with means F and G , G is said to be more dispersed than F in the dilation ordering sense, denoted
for all convex functions , provided these expectations exist (Shaked and Shanthikumar 2007) . Orderings in terms of variances, which are sufficient for a normal distribution, correspond to y = y 2 , whereas a dilation ordering is more general because (13) applies for all convex . A dilation ordering is location invariant by construction because it is defined in terms of differences x − . Proposition 4.6. If F and G are cdfs ofx with finite means F and G , q F and q G are quantiles based on F and G for any fixed p, and S is the scoring rule from (6), then
Proof. The expected score under F can be expressed as
and similarly for G. Thus,
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Operations Research 57(5), pp. 1287 pp. -1297 pp. , © 2009 This is a sufficient and necessary condition for F dil G (Fagiuoli et al. 1999) .
Proposition 4.6 shows that our scoring rule for quantiles rewards sharpness in the sense that an expert whose distribution has less dispersion than the distribution of another expert will have a higher expected score. In other words, a more informed expert can expect a higher score. This provides an incentive for an expert to obtain additional information or to do further analysis with existing information to reduce the dispersion of her distribution.
Although we have investigated the properties of the overall S q x and the corresponding expected score, the assessment of the m quantiles can be done separately. The overall elicitation process might involve both probability assessment and quantile assessment, with a role for scoring rules designed for both types of assessments. The expert should also be given the opportunity to reconcile inconsistencies or to go back and revise assessments if desired, even in the absence of inconsistencies.
Implementation of Scoring Rules for Quantile Assessment
Scoring rules for quantile assessment have been presented in § §3-4, and some of their properties have been investigated. In this section, we turn to issues relevant to practitioners who use quantile assessment in applied decision and risk analysis. To wit, how can these scoring rules be used in practice? An example such as the newsvendor problem shows that the rules can be related to realistic decisionmaking problems, but implementing the rules to assess quantiles from experts is a different situation. First, consider the assessment of a single quantile using the linear rule in (3). This scoring rule has two parameters, p and g. The former is the probability level associated with the quantile (e.g., p = 0 10 for a 0 10 quantile, or 10th percentile), and this simply depends on the particular quantile that the analyst is interested in having the expert assess. For example, is the analyst interested in a central quantile, with p equal to or near 0 5; a quantile in the tails of the distribution, such as p = 0 01 or 0 05 in the lower tail, 0 99 or 0 95 in the upper tail; or perhaps intermediate values such as the quartiles corresponding to p = 0 25 or 0 75? The other parameter, g, simply serves to scale the scores. Because the terms other than g in (3) are both negative, g needs to be sufficiently positive if the analyst wants the expert to have a good chance of, or perhaps be almost guaranteed of, a positive score. The desire for a positive score could be because the expert will actually be rewarded with a monetary amount equal to the score, but more often it is primarily for psychological reasons, so that it can be interpreted as a positive reward even though no actual money changes hands.
In words, the score can be described to the expert as a fixed amount g minus p times the amount the actual value is above the assessed q if it is above or 1 − p times the amount the actual value is below the assessed q if it is below (using the numerical values for p and 1 − p). For example, if p = 0 10, the penalty for a given difference x − q is 9 times as large if q > x than it is if q < x. It might be convenient to show this in graphical form with the actual function or in tabular form with numerical values for scores associated with different amounts x might be above or below the assessed q. Also, the expert can be told that to maximize her expected score, they should report q such that P x < q = p.
Next, what about the assessment of multiple quantiles using the scoring rule in (6)? Now g serves the same purpose, scaling the score as desired, and the analyst chooses multiple probability levels p 1 p m , each of which can be interpreted in the same way p is interpreted above. Usually a mix of low, intermediate, and high values is used, such as the examples of 0.10-0.50-0.90 and 0.05-0.50-0.95 mentioned in §1. Because the score from (6) is additively separable into its m components, which are scores from (3), it is probably easiest to describe the score to the expert separately for each p i , as discussed above for the assessment of a single quantile. This is analogous to what is typically done when using scoring rules to assess multiple probabilities, and it is consistent with the "divide and conquer" spirit of decision analysis. Once the expert gets used to the idea, the process should move along more quickly. In contrast, trying to explain the overall score from (6) could be more confusing for the expert.
Of course, the scoring rules for quantile assessment are useful for evaluation purposes as well as for elicitation. They can be used to track the performance of an expert and to investigate possible improvements over time. Feedback on scores can be valuable information for the experts themselves, helping them understand how they might improve their own performance. Scores for quantile assessments can also be used to make comparisons among different elicitation methods or different types of experts, as is the case with scores for probability assessments (Garthwaite et al. 2005) .
Interval Forecasts
Interval forecasts are widely encountered, in part because of their frequent use, along with interval estimates, in statistics. This means that experts are familiar with the notion of interval forecasts, so a possible assessment method is to assess an interval. If the relevant probabilities are fixed in advance, as in the typical case of a 90% interval that is symmetric in probability (i.e., has equal tail probabilities of 5%), then this is equivalent to assessing two quantiles (the 0 05 and 0 95 quantiles). Alternatively, the two quantiles can be assessed separately without mention of an interval, perhaps with additional assessments (e.g., 0.05-0.50-0.95 quantiles). Of course, it is also possible to start with a fixed interval and assess the probability of the interval, which is probability assessment instead of quantile assessment, but it is more common to fix the probability INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
associated with the interval and assess the quantiles that are the end points. An interval forecast is an important special case of the assessment of multiple quantiles. For an interval forecast using the linear scoring rule in (6), m = 2 and the probability associated with the interval is 1 − = p 2 − p 1 . The slopes of S q x below, within, and above the interval are b 0 = 2 − p 1 + p 2 , b 1 = 1 − p 1 + p 2 , and b 2 = − p 1 + p 2 . Here k = 1 2 if p 1 + p 2 < 1. Dunsmore (1968) and Winkler (1972) consider linear loss functions for interval estimation related to the linear scoring rule in (6).
As noted above, intervals encountered in practice are typically symmetric in probability, which implies that 0 < p 1 < 0 5, p 2 = 1 − p 1 , = 2p 1 , b 0 b 1 b 2 = 1 0 −1 , and k = 1. The scoring rule (6) is of the form
The penalty associated with the width of the interval is w q = /2 q 2 − q 1 . The penalty v q x for deviations of x from q k is q 1 − x if x < q 1 (x is below the interval), zero if q 1 x q 2 (x is in the interval), and x − q 2 if x > q 2 (x is above the interval). Thus, the strictly proper nature of S results from a trade-off between the penalty associated with the width of the interval and the penalty associated with having x fall outside the interval. The rule is flat when x falls within the interval because v q x comes into play only if x is outside the interval. The slopes of the piecewise-linear scoring rule are integers, and arg max S q x is not unique; any x ∈ q 1 q 2 maximizes S q x . From (15), the expected score under truthful reporting for a symmetric interval with = 2p can be simplified to E F S q x = 2g − E q 2 x − E q 1 − x . Intuitively, the partial expectations in the tails should get more extreme (further apart) as the dispersion increases, leading to a decrease in expected score. If F is N , then w q = 2p z and E F v q x = 2 2 −1/2 exp −z 2 /2 − p z , where
For both distributions, the expected score increases as p → 0 for a given standard deviation, which might be thought of as a reflection of an increased difficulty in assessing more extreme quantiles. The same general idea operates separately above and below the interval in the case of an interval that is asymmetric in terms of probability.
Generalizing the Linear Rule Through Transformations
An affine transformation of a strictly proper scoring rule is itself strictly proper, affecting the numerical scores but not changing the basic characteristics of the scoring rule. Gneiting and Raftery (2007) suggest a rule that is based on the linear rule in (5), using a transformation applied not to the scoring rule itself, but to x and therefore to q also. Following their lead, we apply a transformation t to x and q for the linear rule in (3): Proof. Differentiating the expert's expected score yields −t q F q + pt q = 0, which implies that q * = F −1 p . The second-order condition is −t q * F q * < 0 because both t and F are strictly increasing.
The strictly increasing nature of t and F implies that I t x t q is the image of the function I x q under the transformation t, and the p quantile oft = t x is t q . The transformation does not change the underlying linear nature of the scoring rule, although it is now linear in the differences t x − t q + and t q − t x + . For example, if the support ofx is + and t x = log x, the rule is not a logarithmic rule, but it is linear in differences in logarithms. Proposition 7.2 characterizes an essential difference between linear and logarithmic transformations. Proof. The difference t q − t x can be expressed as a function q − x when t is linear and q/x when t is logarithmic. Necessity is based on the solution of a modified Pexider functional equation for the linear case and Cauchy's logarithmic functional equation in the logarithmic case.
The possibility of using a transformation t without losing the strictly proper nature of the scoring rule increases the flexibility of the scoring rules for quantile assessment. For example, if we are obtaining quantile assessments for sales of a new product, t might represent a profit function for the product, and the transformation approach would work if the profit function is increasing in x. This echoes Savage's (1971) "share of the business" notion. An alternative is to assess quantiles directly for profit, but it might be much easier for the expert to think about sales.
Summary and Discussion
Quantile assessment is fundamentally different from probability assessment despite the fact that they can both yield a pair q p . The fact that q is predetermined in probability INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
assessment and p is predetermined in quantile assessment changes the nature of the assessment. As a result, a scoring rule designed for probability assessment provides inappropriate incentives if used for quantile assessment. Maximizing the expected score encourages extreme assessments, not truthful assessments. Although some experts may take the assessment task seriously and try their best to represent their judgments truthfully regardless of whether the scoring rule is suitable for the type of assessment, the misalignment of incentives is problematic. In terms of evaluation, the primary focus is often on calibration. We show that over a series of quantile assessments, an expert can game the system to approach perfect calibration even if she has very little information about the variable of interest. This can be done with extreme assessments, although it can also be accomplished less transparently by hedging in a less extreme manner.
Because of these problems, it is important to design scoring rules specifically for quantile assessment. The linear rule in §3 is strictly proper, easy to understand, and can be related to a realistic inventory problem. As shown in §4, it can be readily extended to the assessment of multiple quantiles for the same variable, and some implementation issues are discussed in §5. The expected score under truthful reporting is location invariant and encourages information seeking by rewarding sharpness: A distribution with less dispersion in a dilation-ordering sense will yield a higher expected score. Commonly encountered interval forecasts can be treated as a special case with two quantiles.
With scoring rules for probability assessment, we know that the expected score must be convex in the expert's probability, and any convex function can be used as an expected score to recover a corresponding strictly proper scoring rule (Savage 1971) . For quantiles, we know of no such way to characterize all strictly proper scoring rules, so this remains an open question. The linear scoring rule studied here can be extended in a variety of ways. For example, a generalization to make the rule linear in a transformation of the variable of interest is discussed in §7. In the assessment of multiple quantiles, some quantiles can be given greater emphasis than others by differential weighting of the terms in the summations in (6). Perhaps the underlying situation makes the lower portion of the distribution seem more important, in which case higher weight could be placed on scores for quantiles with low p i .
The rule could also be extended from the assessment of a finite set of quantiles to the assessment of a full quantile function Q p = F −1 p , just as scoring rules for probability assessment can be extended from the assessment of a discrete distribution to the assessment of a full density function f x (e.g., Matheson and Winkler 1976, Hora 2007) . We leave the details of the continuous case for future research. If an expert reports a continuous distribution in the form of either a density function or a cdf as a representation of her uncertainty about a variable, the evaluation of that distribution should depend on whether the assessment was framed in terms of assessing a density function or cdf or in terms of assessing a quantile function. When assessing a quantile function in practice, we would normally assess a few points on Q p instead of a full function, but those points might form the basis for fitting (and eventually evaluating) a full quantile function.
